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Minnesota Juvenile Couri Rules: Brightening
One World for Juveniles
I. INTRODUCTION
Speaking for the majority in Kent v. United States,1 Justice
Fortas observed:
There is evidence .. that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protection accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children.2
Dean Paulsen, a thoughtful and prolific critic of the juvenile
court process, in commenting on Kent, stated, "[f] or children who
are receiving 'the worst of both worlds' it is no great achieve-
ment to brighten the one that may not matter as much to them."3
His comment reflects a cynicism toward procedural reform in the
juvenile court process which is evidently not shared by many
legislators and judicial officers. For since the revolutionary de-
cisions of Kent and In re Gault,4 statutory revisions of juvenile
court acts and promulgations of juvenile court rules designed to
brighten the procedural world of the juvenile court process have
been proceeding at a fast pace.5
This flurry of procedural reform signals the rejection of the
long held belief that since juvenile court proceedings are tech-
nically noncriminal, they are immune from attack on the
grounds that criminal due process rights have been violated.6
It also heralds the acceptance of the thesis advanced by many
legal commentators that the juvenile court system works most
equitably when its procedures are formalized to meet the consti-
tutional standards of due process.7 Having placed its imprima-
1. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
2. Id. at 556.
3. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of
Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CouRT REv. 167.
4. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. California, Michigan, New Jersey and New York have recently
revised their juvenile court acts or promulgated procedural rules.
6. See Pirsig, The Constitutional Validity of Confining Juvenile
Delinquents in Penal Institutions, 54 IIwN. L. REV. 101, 102 (1969).
Paulsen, supra note 3, at 173. For background concerning the develop-
ment of the juvenile court system see Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
HAv. L. REv. 104 (1909) and Hurley, Origins of the Illinois Juvenile
Court Law, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE CouRT 328 (1925).
7. See, e.g., Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MiNN.
L. REv. 547 (1957); Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court: A
Challenge to Lawyers, 52 A.B.A.J. 923 (1966); F. ALiLN, THE BoRDER-
LAND OF THE CRimiNAL LAW: PROBLEMS OF LOCALIZING C mMN.AI JUS-
TiCE 19-23 (1964).
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tur on this thesis by its decisions in Kent and Gault, the Supreme
Court can be expected to continue the process of what Dean
Paulsen calls the "domestication" of the juvenile court. In his
words, the language of Gault "reads like a warning shot, fired to
gain the attention of state court judges and lawmakers. It will
not go unheeded by the prudent."8
The Minnesota Juvenile Court Judges Association must be
numbered among the prudent. In response to the Supreme
Court, the recommendations of a state executive body9 and its
own long felt need for established rules of procedure, the Asso-
ciation promulgated the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules 0 which
became effective in all Minnesota Probate-Juvenile Courts on
March 1, 1969." Although the Rules must necessarily fit within
the framework of the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act, 12 their cre-
ation of new rights and responsibilities for participants in the
juvenile court cause will have a profound effect on all stages of
procedure in the juvenile-probate courts. 13
8. Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile
Court, 1967 Sup. COURT REV. 237.
9. MINNESOTA GovERNOR's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, AD.
OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS, REPORT OF COixMM. ON AD. or JUSTICE,
SUBcoimnm. JUVENILE PROCEDURES AND FACIIaTIES (Jan. 1968).
10. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN THE
MINNESOTA PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS (1969), as amended, (Supp. Sept.
1969) [hereinafter cited in notes as MJCR and in the text as the Rules].
11. The Minnesota Juvenile Court Act provides for two distinct
types of juvenile courts. MINN. STAT. § 260.021 (1) (1967) provides that
"[iln counties now or hereafter having a population of more than
200,000, the district court is the juvenile court." MINN. STAT. § 260.021
(4) (1967) provides: "In counties now or hereafter having a population
of not more than 200,000, the probate court is the juvenile court." As
of this date the district courts of Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, which
include the cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul, respectively, havejurisdiction over juvenile court causes and thus are not subject to the
Rules. MINN. STAT. § 260.021(1) (1967). While St. Louis County,
which includes Duluth, has a population in excess of 200,000, it re-
cently transferred jurisdiction to the probate court; thus the Rules
apply to this county. MJCR 1-2 (d). Judge Lindsay Arthur of the Hen-
nepin County District Court, Juvenile Division, recently proposed new
rules of procedure for that court, and a District Court committee is now
studying these rules with a view toward adoption. References to the
PROPOSED JUVENILE COURT RULES FOR HEXNEPIN COUNTY (Draft No. 2,
Dec. 31, 1968) will be made throughout the Note.
12. MINN. STAT. ch. 260 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as "the
Act," "the statute," or "the Juvenile Court Act"].
13. See, e.g., MJCR 2-1 which provides that "[e]ach party to ajuvenile cause shall have the right to be represented by counsel at any
and all stages of the cause." (emphasis added). MINN. STAT. § 260.155
(2) (1967) gives parties the right to counsel at hearings held pur-
suant to the statute. By its terms, therefore, the Rules seem to widen
the scope of right to counsel.
[Vol. 54:303
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II. AUTHORITY AND APPLICATION OF THE RULES
Commenting on the question of whether the Minnesota Ju-
venile Court Rules have the force and effect of law, the office of
the Attorney General has stated:
[W]hether these rules have the force and effect of law depends,
of course, upon whether the judges have authority from the
legislature to adopt the same. This question we decline to com-
ment upon, feeling the matter should be more appropriately
decided by the courts. 14
The reluctance of the Attorney General to determine the ques-
tion of the Rules' authority is understandable. The law is
marked by a dearth of decisions and the presence of ambiguous
statutes on the subject of court rules generally and rules gov-
erning the probate-juvenile court in particular. It is important,
nevertheless, to determine to what extent the rules are author-
ized because therein lies the key to much of their efficacy.
The threshold principle in this area of the law states that
when a statute gives the courts jurisdiction over certain subjects
but does not provide procedures to follow, the courts have the
inherent power to adopt appropriate rules.15 It seems prefer-
able, however, to find specific statutory authorization, for, as the
Attorney General's comment suggests, rules authorized by the
legislature are enveloped with a certain aura that gives them a
more binding effect. The inherent power doctrine also may be
read as entitling each individual juvenile court to formulate its
own rules, and such an interpretation would defeat the desire
for a uniform juvenile court procedure in the state.
Though there is no express statutory provision granting ju-
venile court judges the authority to promulgate juvenile court
rules of procedure, probate court judges are authorized by sec-
tion 525.06 of the Minnesota Statutes to formulate and adopt
rules to govern all probate courts. 6 Since the Minnesota Ju-
venile Judges Association, the promulgator of the Rules, con-
sists of all the probate judges in the state, and because the pro-
14. Copy of letter from James J. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, State of Minnesota, Office of the The Attorney Gen-
eral, to Wallace C. Sieh, Mower County Attorney, August 6, 1969, on file
at the office of the Minnesota Law Review.
15. Whaley v. Bayer, 99 Minn. 397, 109 N.W. 596 (1906); cf. Phillips
v. Ericson, 248 Minn. 452, 476, 80 N.W.2d 513, 528 (1957).
16. MwNu. STAT. § 525.06 (1967) provides in part:
The judges of the probate courts shall assemble each year at
such places and times as may be designated .... When so
assembled such judges shall formulate and adopt rules ....
Such rules shall govern all the probate courts of this state ....
19691
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bate court is the juvenile court in all counties where these Rules
are in effect,1'7 this statute seems to authorize the promulga-
tion of juvenile court rules, albeit by a somewhat circuitous route.
The argument is strengthened when one considers that the legis-
lature has expressly granted rule making authority to all other
courts in Minnesota, 8 thus raising the implication that the
legislature meant to provide the probate court judges with both
probate and juvenile court rule making authority when it en-
acted section 525.06. Accordingly, the Minnesota Juvenile Judges
Association formulated and adopted the Rules pursuant to section
525.06.-9
Assuming that section 525.06 provides statutory authority
for promulgation of the Rules, there remains the question of
whether the Rules are strictly binding upon individual juvenile
court judges and appellate courts reviewing juvenile court or-
ders. In other words, will noncompliance with the Rules be
grounds for reversal of a juvenile court order? As a general
proposition, court rules authorized by the legislature have the
force and effect of law and thus are binding upon the courts, 2 0
but several Minnesota decisions have modified this proposition.
In 1950, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
[Ilt has been recognized in this jurisdiction that the trial court
in its sound discretion may in a particular case suspend the
operation of its rules .... Court rules are adopted to expedite
the administration of justice, and when in a particular case
they fail of their purpose they may for cause be modified or
suspended in the court's discretion. 21
Similarly, the court in Swenson v. Swenson22 held that a minor
deviation from the district court rules by the trial court was of
no consequence where it did not operate in any way to the preju-
dice of a party.. Apart from this precedent, there is language in
17. See note 11 supra.
18. bMm. STAT. § 480.05 (1967) (rule-making authority to Su-
preme Court); MNN. STAT. § 484.33 (1967) (rule-making authority to
district courts); MINN. STAT. ch. 488 (1967) (rule-making authority to
municipal courts); MINN. STAT. § 525.06 (1967) (rule-making authority
to probate courts); MNN. STAT. § 491.03 (1967) (procedure for con-
ciliation courts).
19. See MJCR Foreword.
20. See, e.g., Rio Grande Irrigation Co. v. Gildersleeve, 174 U.S.
603 (1898).
21. Thon v. Erickson, 232 Minn. 323, 2,24, 45 N.W.2d 560, 561 (1950).
22. 257 Minn. 431, 101 N.W.2d 914 (1960). See also Saylor v. Sass,
258 Minn. 300, 104 N.W.2d 36 (1960) where the court held that compli-
ance with court rules of the Duluth Municipal Court could be waived,
either expressly or by conduct, by the party standing to benefit from
them.
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section 525.06 itself which specifically allows individual judges
to relax or modify rules adopted by the judges when such will
be "in furtherance of justice."2 3 This language and the prior de-
cisions dealing with modifications of other species of court rules
could support a holding that individual juvenile court judges
may relax or modify the Rules and that such noncompliance will
not be grounds for automatic reversal of a juvenile court order.
Such a holding, however, would be unwise. Juvenile court
judges who oppose certain provisions of the Rules may use such
authority to deny some children the protection of some of the
more liberal provisions of the Rules under the guise of "further-
ing justice." Moreover, modification of the Rules will sacrifice
uniformity and precision in juvenile court procedure, one of the
avowed purposes of the Rules. Finally, whenever a violation of
the Rules is alleged, appellate courts would be forced to deter-
mine whether or not such noncompliance prejudiced the child
and thus would be forced to develop juvenile court procedural
law on an ad hoe basis instead of relying on the Rules as a defini-
tive statement of the rights of a child in juvenile court. It is
submitted that the better view would be that noncompliance
with the Rules is per se prejudicial and will invalidate a juvenile
court order.
There is authority for such a determination, though it is not
precisely on point. The United States Supreme Court seems
to support the view that court rules are not to be relaxed or
modified at the discretion of individual judges. The Court has
stated:
A rule of the court thus authorized and made has the force of
law, and is binding upon the court as well as upon parties to an
action, and cannot be dispensed with to suit the circumstances
of any particular case.2 4
More recently, the Court in United States ex rel. Accardi v.
23. It provides:
Such rules shall govern all the probate courts of this state, but,
in furtherance of justice, the court may relax or modify them or
relieve a party from the effect thereof on such terms as may
be just.
Cf. Pearson, An Explanation of Rule 2 of the Code of Rules for the Dis-
trict Courts of Minnesota, 27B im. STAT. ANN. 34-36 (1968). Judge
Pearson, in discussing a recent amendment to rule 2, stated: "[T]he
new rule is not a statute nor a Supreme Court Rule of Civil Procedure.
I prefer not to call it a rule at all, for it is a standard, or a guide, or
call it what you will ... ." Id. at 35.
24. Rio Grande Irrigation Co. v. Gildersleeve, 174 U.S. 603, 608
(1898), quoting Thompson v. Hatch, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 512 (1826).
19691
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Shaugnessy 5 held that petitioner's allegation that the Attorney
General dictated the Immigration Bcard's decision in violation of
the board's own regulations constituted a claim of denial of due
process. The holding thus implies that rules adopted by an ad-
ministrative agency are strictly binding upon it and that non-
compliance with such rules invalidates an action of the agency.
The logical extension of such a holding is that court rules are
equally binding.
Similar viewpoints have been set forth by various state
courts. In Halter v. Wade,26 for example, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that no single judge has the power to ignore or waive
the enforcement of a rule promulgated by the Denver District
Court en banc. The court stated:
[The rule] was made to be enforced just as much so as if the
legislature by statute enacted it, and in that case no court orjudge could properly disobey it.27
Other cases have held that court rules must be considered bind-
ing unless the rules themselves provide for modification or re-
laxation by an individual judge. In Collins v. Superior Court,28
the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
The general rule is that ... rules are binding alike upon the
litigants and cannot be dispensed with to meet the exigencies
in a particular case or to meet an apparent hardship, except
when the rules themselves provide a method for such suspension,
and then only in the manner so provided. 29
It should be noted here that while section 525.06 permits relaxa-
tion or modification, the Rules themselves do not. This, it could
be argued, implies that the Juvenile Court Judges Association
did not intend that its individual members have authority to
relax or modify the Rules.
The above authority when coupled with the policy consider-
ations previously discussed would seem to warrant the conclu-
sions that the Rules may not be modified or relaxed at the dis-
cretion of individual juvenile court judges and that noncompli-
ance with the Rules will be automatic grounds for reversal of
a juvenile court order.
25. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
26. 85 Colo. 121, 273 P. 1042 (1928).
27. Id. at 124, 273 P. at 1044.
28. 48 Ariz. 381, 62 P.2d 131 (1936).
29. Id. at 395, 62 P.2d at 138.
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III. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE MINNESOTA
JUVENILE COURT RULES
A. GrmRAL
The Minnesota Juvenile Court Act and the Minnesota Juve-
nile Court Rules are similar to the statutes and rules of most
other states in that they can be divided into five broad categories.
First, there are those provisions which define, in terms of age
and either conduct or status, persons subject to juvenile court
jurisdiction. A second set of provisions governs the procedure to
be followed when an individual, alleged to be within the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court, comes to the attention of the police or
the court itself. At this intake or pre-adjudication stage, the
initial decision is made either to make informal adjustment or to
refer the individual to the juvenile court. If the child is so re-
ferred, a third set of provisions provides for an adjudication
hearing. At this stage of the process the court must determine
whether the party is in fact within the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court, and whether he has committed the acts, or is of the
status, alleged. If the child is found to be delinquent, neglected,
dependent or a traffic offender, the provisions providing for a
disposition hearing take effect. The disposition hearing deter-
mines what treatment the individual will receive in order to
fulfill the rehabilitative goal of the court. Finally, there are
provisions authorizing review and appeal of juvenile court or-
ders and disposition of the court's records.
B. DEFINNG JURISDICTION
1. Age
The Minnesota juvenile courts have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over persons less than 18 years of age who are al-
leged to be delinquent, dependent, neglected or a traffic of-
fender, and over those under 21 years of age alleged to have
been delinquent or a traffic offender prior to their eighteenth
birthday.30 The majority of states agree with the recommen-
dation of the Children's Bureau that individuals age 18 and over
are not proper subjects for the juvenile court.31 Age alone, how-
ever, is inevitably an arbitrary factor and virtually all states
30. MuNm. STAT. § 260.211 (1967).
31. PREsIDENT's ComivfN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD. or
JUSTICE, TAsK FORCE REPORT, JUVENILE DELINQUENcY m YOUTH CRHIaE
3-5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE].
19691
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grant the juvenile court a limited power to refer certain types
of delinquency actions to the criminal courts. Both the Act
and Rules provide for such reference if the child is alleged
to have violated a state or local law or ordinance and is at
least 14 years of age. 32 The minimum age limit is arguably
too low3 3 but unlike most jurisdictions the Rules set out criteria
relevant to the referral decision.3 4
2. Conduct or Status
One of the most persistent criticisms leveled at the juvenile
court system is the breadth of the statutory definition of conduct
or status which gives rise to juvenile court jurisdiction. It has
been argued that the definitions are so broad that the insignifi-
cant, noninjurious acts of normal individuals can be the basis of
a juvenile court finding of delinquency, neglect or dependency.33
Such findings may, in turn, result in the possibility of separating
a child from his home and tainting him and his parents with the
stigma attached to a juvenile court adjudication. 36 The Minne-
sota Act, although amended in 1959 to narrow the definitions of
delinquent, dependent and neglected children, still retains many
deficiencies. One of the most serious is the definition of delin-
quency as a violation of any law or ordinance, regardless of
whether the act evidences a delinquen; disposition.37 Since rules
of procedure cannot restrict statutory definitions, the Minnesota
Rules can only reiterate the definitions contained in the stat-
ute.38  To rectify this deficiency, the Minnesota Legislature
32. MmiN. STAT. §§ 260.125, 260.193 (4) (1967); MJCR 8-1.
33. NAT'L PROBATION AND PAROLE Ass'N, STANDARD JUVENILE COURT
ACT § 13 (6th ed. 1959) sets a minimum age of 16.
34. MJCR 8-7(2). Cf. TAsK FORCE, supra note 31, at 4: "Written
criteria to guide the judge in deciding whether or not to waive
[jurisdiction] are rare. Where they do exist they are general." MJCR
8-2 & 8-6 specify other limitations on the authority to refer. Transfer
or reference for prosecution is discussed at length in Note, Reference for
Prosecution in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 54 MiNN. L. REv. 389 (1969).
35. Pirsig, Juvenile Delinquency and Crime: Achievements of the
1959 Minnesota Legislature, 44 MINN. L. REv. 363, 379-81 (1960). Paul-
sen, The Delinquency, Neglect, and Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juve-
nile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHmD 44, 49-51 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962);
Glueck, Some "Unfinished Business" in the Management of Juvenile
Delinquency, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 628, 631-32 (1964).
36. See, e.g., In re Diaz, 212 La. 700, 33 So. 2d 201 (1947) (reversal
of a juvenile court finding of neglect based on one incident where
mother spanked baby in public).
37. See Pirsig, supra note 35, at 379-80.
38. See MJCR 1-2(e), (f), (m).
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should amend the Act by further narrowing the definition of
conduct which gives rise to juvenile court jurisdiction.
In addition, the Act and Rules both provide that the same
tribunal has jurisdiction whether a child is alleged to be delin-
quent, dependent or neglected. This policy is justified on the
theory that, regardless of the allegations contained in the peti-
tion, the sole purpose of the court is to insure the welfare of the
child.3 9 A contrary view is that the juvenile court's jurisdiction
should be limited to the delinquent child, and the neglected or
dependent child should be referred to existing social agencies.40
Militating against such a policy, however, is the fact that a de-
pendent or neglected child must often be taken from the custody
of his parents in order to protect him, and it seems unwise to
allow such a disposition without the procedural safeguards of a
judicial hearing.
The recently approved Uniform Juvenile Court Act 41 seems
to have struck a balance between the two extremes. It provides
for three classes of children subject to juvenile court jurisdic-
tion: the delinquent child, the unruly child and the deprived
child. The delinquent child, who is subject to commitment to
an institution,42 is one who has violated any law and is in need
of treatment or rehabilitation. The unruly child has committed
an offense applicable only to children, such as truancy. ie is
also in need of treatment and rehabilitation and is subject to the
same disposition as a delinquent child, short of commitment to
an institution for delinquent children.43 The deprived child,
analogous to the neglected child under Minnesota law, requires
care or control for the welfare of his physical, mental or emo-
tional health but his deprivation is not due primarily to the lack
of financial means of his parents.4 This change in labels from
"neglected" to "deprived" is said to ease the stigma attached to
parents by a "neglect" adjudication and to focus attention on the
needs of the child rather than on the fitness of the parent. More
importantly, the definition eliminates poverty as a legitimate
basis for a finding of deprivation45 and thereby helps to promote
family stability in those homes most in need of it.
39. See MiNN. STAT. § 260.011(2) (1967).
40. TAsK FoRcE, supra note 31, at 22.
41. NAT'L CONRENCE or ComirVssioNERs ON UNIwo~mv STATE
LAws, UNIFoim JuvENI. COURT ACT (1968) [hereinafter cited as U-
FORm JuvEi4E COURT ACT].
42. Id. § 2(3).
43. Id. § 2(4).
44. Id. § 2(5).
45. Id. § 2, comments.
19691
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The Minnesota Act and the Rules apply the Uniform Act
policy with respect to juvenile traffic offenders. Both Acts pro-
vide that a juvenile traffic offender cannot be adjudicated de-
linquent for the sole reason of having violated a traffic ordi-
nance. Instead, such conduct will lead to an adjudication of the
youth as a juvenile traffic offender and disposition will be lim-
ited to probation or a recommendation to the Motor Vehicle Com-
missioner that the youth's license be suspended.46  The stigma
attached to delinquency is thus avoided47 and disposition is more
likely to fit the conduct.48 The same procedure, it appears, could
be applied to noncriminal juvenile behavior, such as truancy
which can now be the basis for a finding of delinquency. 49 Im-
plementation of such a scheme, however, would seem to require
legislative action, since the various categories of conduct or
status are defined by statute.50
The Minnesota Act and Rules also provide for a distinct
cause of action for the termination of parental rights, apart from
neglect or dependency causes.51 Termination of parental rights
makes a child subject to adoption, which by statute confers upon
him the legal status of a natural child of his adoptive parents.52
The finality and enormity of the consequences of such an ad-
judication have prompted both the Act and Rules to provide for
a separate notice and hearing before termination can be effected,
46. A1nyl. STAT. § 260.193 (1967); MJCR 6-6.
47. See Winburn v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 152, 162, 145 N.W.2d 178, 183
(1966): "This court can take judicial notice that in common parlance
juvenile delinquent is a term of opprobrium and it is not society's
accolade bestowed on the successfully rehabilitated."
48. "To require the court to declare a juvenile to be a delinquent
child and a ward of the court for the violation of a relatively minor
traffic regulation is, in our opinion, too harsh a required sanction to
be imposed." Lesperance v. Superior Court, 72 Wash. 2d 572, 575, 434
P.2d 602, 605 (1967).
49. MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (5) (C) (1967).
50. See Mn.w'. STAT. § 260.015 (1967).
51. MfNN. STAT. § 260.111(2) (a) (1967) (grants juvenile court
jurisdiction for termination of parental rights); MINN. STAT. § 260.221
(situations when termination of parental rights may be granted);
MmUw. STAT. § 260.241 (dispositional alternatives for a child who is the
subject of a termination of parental rights cause); MJCR 3-5 (required
contents for a petition in a termination of parental rights cause); MJCR
6-6 (dispositional alternatives for child who is the subject of a termi-
nation of parental rights cause).
52. In re Barron, 268 MAinn. 48, 127 N.W.2d 702 (1964); cf. In re
Zink, 269 Minn. 535, 132 N.W.2d 795 (1964); In re Shady, 264 Minn. 222,
118 N.W.2d 449 (1962).
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even though there may have been a prior dependency or neglect
adjudication.53
In summary, the new Rules have no effect on the jurisdic-
tional definitions of the Juvenile Court Act. They have simply
restated the type of conduct which will bring a child within the
jurisdiction of the court. Some modifications of this jurisdic-
tional posture have been briefly advanced, but it seems clear
that court rules are incapable of effecting them. Revision of the
Juvenile Court Act, therefore, particularly with regard to the
novel classifications contained in the Uniform Juvenile Court
Act, should be seriously considered.
C. PRE-ADJUDICATION PROVISIONS
1. Intake
In a traditional sense, the intake phase of the juvenile court
process is extra-judicial, since it involves the disposition of a
child who is subject to juvenile court jurisdiction without formal
court hearings or orders. Intake has been defined as
[a] process of . . . ascertaining which cases require no action,
which require referral to other agencies, which can be benefitted
and adjusted by treatment without judicial action, and which
need judicial action.54
This "screening" process is not administered solely by the court.
Indeed, empirical studies reveal that the police are the initial
screening agency in most cases.55
Screening by the police and other nonjudicial agencies is
of great concern to some observers of the juvenile court. The
process does have many advantages:
[C]ourt caseloads are lightened; police develop a more positive
attitude towards their role in curbing delinquency; juveniles
have an opportunity to avoid court adjudication; and parental
control may be strengthened by police support and by the spec-
tre of possible referral to the juvenile court.5 6
Yet the fear remains that the informal adjustments made by
the police involve restrictions on a child's freedom which
neither fit the alleged misconduct nor encourage the child's
53. This procedure meets the recommendation of the Anvisony
COUNCIL OF JUDGES or THE NAT'L PROBATION AND PAROLE ASS'N, GUIDES
FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES 24 (1957).
54. Id.
55. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and In-
dividualized Justice, 79 HAlv. L. REv. 775, 785 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Juvenile Delinquents]. See also Note, Juvenile Court Intake:
Form and Function, 5 WIL.. L.J. 121, 122-23 (1968).
56. Note, Juvenile Delinquents, supra note 55, at 785.
19691
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rehabilitation. An additional fear is that, while ostensibly vol-
untary, the submission by the child or his parents to a display
of authority at a time of stress is in fact coerced.57 A resolution
of this dilemma which would retain the benefits of informal
police adjustment while providing safeguards to the alleged
delinquent has not yet been reached. However, the increasing
professionalism of urban police forces in providing trained, fair
and sympathetic juvenile officers and the growing sophistica-
tion of modern youth mitigate against any inherent unfairness
in the system. The extension of basic rights, such as right to
counsel in the police station and closer analysis and supervision
of police records, could also provide adequate safeguards. 5 Im-
provement of informal police adjustment procedures would seem
to be a fruitful area in which court rules could operate. They
could, for example, set out criteria for police to use in de-
ciding whether to refer cases or they could require courts to
set up a liaison office staffed by a court representative with
whom the police could confer. Unfortunately, the Minnesota
Rules do not acknowledge the existence of this aspect of screen-
ing. As a consequence, individual juvenile judges are left with
the ill-fitting responsibility of exerting leadership in improving
and controlling this process.59
In addition, neither the Act nor the Rules authorize specific
intake procedures to be followed by the juvenile court in deter-
mining whether to proceed formally by the filing of a petition6
57. Id. at 780.
58. See Handler & Rosenheim, PrivacVy in Welfare: Public Assist-
ance and Juvenile Justice, 31 LAW & CoNTEMz. PROB. 377, 408-09
(1966). The authors list several other measures which could improve
and regulate informal police adjustment.
59. This discussion has confined itself to informal screening by
the police of alleged delinquents. But dependency and neglect cases
are, also, often first brought to the attention of the police. It has been
reported that the Chicago police claim to refer dependency and neglect
cases to social agencies immediately. Id. at 395-401. The authors,
however, point out that immediate referrals are many times impossi-
ble and therefore the police will be forced to make some adjustment,
especially in the emergency "child beating" cases. The moral is appar-
ent-juvenile courts must become more aware of this adjustment
made by police and other public agencies and begin to exert more direc-
tion and control over its operation.
60. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.131(1) & (2) (:1967) provides that any "rep-
utable person" having knowledge of a child who appears to be delin-
quent, neglected or dependent may file a petition with the juvenile
court, and that the county attorney or any other person shall draft the
petition on a showing of reasonable grounds to support it. MJCR 3-1(1) (a), however, states that only the county attorney may draft such
a petition.
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or to attempt to adjust the case informally.61 Though some
individual courts do have an intake office of sorts,6 2 the lack
of express provisions in the Act and the Rules probably means
that in many counties a child referred to the juvenile court
usually faces the extremes of formal adjudication or dismissal.
As the President's Commission on Crime and Delinquency
points out, however,
a great deal of juvenile misbehavior should be dealt with through
alternatives to adjudication in accordance with an explicit policy
to direct juvenile offenders away from formal adjudication and
authoritative disposition and to nonjudicial institutions for guid-
ance and other services ...
Improvements in the several stages of the predispositional
process would result in more selective and discriminating judg-
ments as to those who should be subjected to formal and authori-
tative surveillance in the interest of community protection.63
Court rules are a particularly effective tool for making improve-
ments in the predispositional process. They could, for example,
prescribe that conferences or hearings take place prior to the
formal filing of a petition, and authorize disposition based on
consent decrees agreed upon by the court, the child and his
parents.6 4
Although neither the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act nor the
Rules provide for any informal pre-petition adjustment, they
both authorize informal disposition after the initial adjudicatory
hearing in delinquency causes.6 5 The court may proceed with
disposition without a formal order declaring the child delinquent
if the child has admitted the allegations contained in the peti-
tion or there has been a hearing where the allegations have been
duly proven. This informal disposition may extend for a period
61. Informal adjustment without the filing of a petition might in-
clude referral to a community agency, informal supervision by the pro-
bation staff, or simply a conference with a child and his parents.
62. In Anoka County, for example, police juvenile contacts are re-
ferred to a court referee who determines whether the formal process of
the juvenile court should be used. If he does decide that a petition
should be filed, the information is relayed to the county attorney who
in turn drafts the petition. Interview with Robert Johnson, Jr., Ass't.
County Attorney, Anoka County, Minnesota, in Anoka, Minnesota, June
17, 1969.
63. TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 16.
64. See, e.g., UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT, supra note 41, § 10
(1968); M1cmAN JuvmuuL COURT RULES (1969); NEW JERsEYz JuvmNILE
AND DOMEsTIC RELATIONS COURT RULES, PROCEDURE IN JUVE CAUSES
6:2-2, 6:3-2, 6:8, 6:9-1 (1969); N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 734 (McKinney
1962).
65. MINN. STAT. § 260.185(3) (1967); MJCR 5-4(1) (a).
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of 90 days, after which the case is dismissed or a formal adju-
dication of delinquency is filed. An adjudication of delinquency
with its attendant stigma may thereby be prevented, yet the
child will receive some treatment or supervision from the ju-
venile court. There are several benefits to be gained through
this procedure. The juvenile court itself determines that the
alleged acts were committed by the child and that such acts
render the child subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. Clearly
the court rather than the county attorney, the police or other
agency is best qualified to make this determination. The court,
rather than another agency, will also determine disposition and
presumably its experience and ability to research the child's
background and environment will aid. in the disposition decision.
Weighing against these considerations is the fact that this
procedure nonetheless involves the filing of a petition and a for-
mal court appearance-presumably a traumatic experience likely
to result in the unnecessary stigma of delinquency. 6  More-
over, this procedure does not provide a means by which trivial
cases can be eliminated from court consideration.
A 1969 amendment 67 to the Act eliminated a prior require-
ment that this non-adjudicatory alternative could be invoked
only if the child had admitted the allegations of the petition.
Presumably, such a requirement had been intended to protect
the child by insuring that the allegations of the petition were true
before allowing even this limited disposition. Another reason
for such a qualification may have been the desire to restrict non-
adjudicatory adjustment to those children with a proper atti-
tude. But certainly, admission of the allegations is not conclu-
sive proof of contrition and, even if it were, there is no proven
correlation between contrition and successful adjustment. The
child's attitude should be only one of several criteria considered
by the court when deciding whether to invoke this disposition.68
66. See Note, Sealing of Juvenile Court Records, 54 MN. L.
REV. 433 (1969).
67. M.Nx. STAT. § 260.185(3) (1967), as amended, (Mixny. SEss. L.
SERv. ch. 1019 (1969).
68. A valuable contribution to the Rules might have been a listing
of criteria to consider when deciding whether to apply informal dis-
position. The six factors listed in the Manual of Procedure of the Youth
Division of the Chicago Police Department, as noted in Handler &
Rosenheim, supra note 58, at 408-09 are:
1. Type and seriousness of the offense.
2. The previous behavioral history of the juvenile.
3. Environmental factors, including the disposition and capacity of
the juvenile.
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Thus the decision to do away with the restriction is a sound one
and should allow the juvenile court judges to make more use of
this alternative to formal adjudication and disposition.
2. Petition: Drafting, Filing and Contents
The petition is the legal document by which a juvenile court
cause is commenced.69 Its purpose is to give notice of the basis
of the cause, including the conduct or status alleged and the
fact of the court's jurisdiction. The Minnesota Act provides that
"any reputable person" may initiate a petition if he has knowl-
edge of a child who appears to be delinquent, neglected or de-
pendent, and if he verifies the petition.7 0 In response to Gault,71
the Rules require a more specific petition, including a "clear and
particularized statement of the facts on which the petitioner re-
lies for the assertion that the child is ' 72 delinquent, neglected or
dependent.
These requirements compare favorably with those of other
states and in most cases are superior. New Jersey, for example,
requires that the petition need only state the essential facts.7 3
Similarly, in Michigan the petition need only be of "sufficient
clarity and specificity to reasonably apprise the parties of the
matters concerning which court action is sought."7 4 An improve-
ment that might be made in Minnesota is suggested by the New
York statute which limits persons authorized to file a petition to
a peace officer, parent or guardian, one who has suffered injury
as a result of the alleged activity of the child or the recognized
4. The attitudes of the parents and their "ability to provide the
necessary supervision and guidance."
5. The attitude of the complainant.
6. Community resources.
69. MJCR 1-2(q).
70. M mn. STAT. § 260.131 (1967).
71. 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
72. See MJCR 3-2(1) (a) (iii), 3-2(1) (b) (ii), 3-3(1) (a) (ii), 3-3(1)(c) (iii), 3-4(1) (b) (iii), 3-4(1) (c) (iii). Cf. In re Hitzemann, 281 Minn.
275, 161 N.W.2d 542 (1968), which held sufficient a petition alleging
simply that the appellant "did on October 3, 1966, at 8:46 p.m., at
Montgomery Ward and Company in Sun Ray Shopping Center, steal two
tires valued at approximately $50.00." Id. at 276, 161 N.W.2d at 543.
Clearly this petition does not meet the requirements of MJCR 3-2
(1) (a) which states that the law or ordinance alleged to have been vio-
lated must be specified in the petition. The fact that the Rules were
not in effect when the case was decided is likely to relegate Hitzemann
to obscurity, at least as regards probate-juvenile court procedure.
73. NEW JERSEY JUVENILE AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS COURT RULES,
PROCEDURE IN JUVENILE CAUSES 5:8-1 (1969).
74. McmGAx JUVENILE COURT RIULES 4 (1969).
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agents of an institution or agency.75 Such a limitation may pre-
vent the filing of meddlesome petitions by parties who are un-
duly concerned with a child's behavior or who are merely in-
terested in the harassment of a child or his family. The New
York statute, however, does not require that the petition be veri-
fied and thus might encourage unsuppDrted allegations.
3. Summons and Notice
The Minnesota Juvenile Court Act provides two means for
the issuance and service of summons and notice upon parties to
the cause. The court may issue a summons and have it served
personally upon the parties,76 or it may make notice in lieu of
personal service by delivering the summons by certified mail and
publishing it for one week.77 The Rules provide for an alterna-
tive method which may be utilized prior to either of the statu-
tory alternatives. To minimize the embarrassment attached to
personal service by a sheriff who often makes service in a con-
spicuously marked car and in uniform, the Rules provide for no-
tice in lieu of summons.78 The parties are informed of the peti-
tion by mail and are requested to appear before the court, at
which time jurisdiction arises due to their presence. If the par-
ties refuse to appear voluntarily, or if the notice does not reach
them, resort must be had to personal service or mail-and-publi-
cation.
Persons required to be notified or summoned are identical,
with one exception, in the Act and the Rules.79 The Rules pro-
vide that the court is required to make service of summons upon
the subject of a delinquency cause, i.e. the child himself.8 0 This
addition is necessitated by language in Gault requiring that the
child, as well as his parents or guardian, be notified.8 '
75. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. § 733 (McKinney 1962).
76. Mum. STAT. § 260.135 (1967).
77. Muix. STAT. § 260.141(1)(b) (1967).
78. MJCR 4-3.
79. MhNm. STAT. §§ 260.135, 260.193(2), 260.231(3) (1967); MJCR
4-1. Persons summoned are required to be present; persons notified
have a right, but are not required, to be present. The person who has
custody or control of the child is summon-ad, and the parents are noti-
fied if they do not have custody or control. Id.
80. MJCR 4-1 (b). MJCR 4-6 qualifies this requirement by stating
that the summons or notice shall be given to the parent on the child's
behalf if the child is under 14 years of age.
81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967). Such a requirement is desir-
able to provide for those cases where the parents are hostile or indiffer-
ent to the interests of the child.
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The Rules make significant additions to the required content
of a summons and initial notice.82  These additions include a
statement of the purposes and possible consequences of the
scheduled adjudicatory hearing and a statement advising the
person summoned of all his rights, including specific mention of
the parties' right to counsel and the fact that an attorney will
be appointed if a party desires but cannot afford one. The Rules
state that a petition shall be attached to the summons in all
causes except traffic offender causes, 8 3 in contrast to the Act
which states that the petition be attached or a summary of its
allegations be set forth in the summons.84 It would seem that
the only reason for not attaching a petition is the danger of com-
promising the secrecy of the cause or perhaps embarrassing or
frightening the child. Neither of these reasons, however, suffi-
ciently outweighs the desirability of allowing the child, his par-
ents and his attorney to know exactly what is alleged so that
they may intelligently prepare for the proceedings. To this end,
the Rules also require that copies of notices be given to counsel
representing any of the parties to the cause.85
The Rules require that service be "sufficiently in advance
of the hearing to which it relates to afford ... a reasonable op-
portunity to prepare" and set a minimum period of 72 hours.8 6
This is in contrast to the Act which sets a minimum of 24 hours
after personal service, five days after mailing of notice-in-lieu-
of-personal service or 14 days if the party to be notified is out
of state.8 7 The language of the Rules is similar to that used in
Gault,88 and the 72 hour minimum seems to allow sufficient
time to the parties while not unnecessarily delaying the com-
mencement of proceedings. To prevent unnecessary delay, the
blanket waiver provision 9 provides that a child can waive serv-
ice of process by consenting to waiver of his parents or guardian
ad litem.
82. MJCR 4-2. Compare MANx. STAT. §§ 260.135(1), 260.193(2),
260.231(3) (1967). Initial notice is that given to the parents if they do
not have custody and control of the child. See MImN. STAT. § 260.135
(2) (1967).
83. MJCR 4-2.
84. MINN. STAT. § 260.135(1) (1967).
85. MJCR 4-7.
86. MJCR 4-4.
87. MNN. STAT. § 260.141(1) (a) & (b) (1967).
88. 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
89. MJCR 1-5 (any right accorded a party by the Rules or the Act
may be waived except the right to counsel at a reference for prosecu-
tion hearing and the right to nondisclosure of sealed records).
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Neither the Act nor Rules provide for answers to petitions
served on the parties. The Model Juvenile Rules are unique in
that they provide for detailed responsive pleading.
Upon receipt of the petition, the parties may file an answer,
admitting or denying any or all of the allegations of the petition.
The answer may request more detailed allegations or may point
out inconsistencies or gaps in the statement contained in the
petition. No formal motion practice is provided, but if the com-
plainant, the parties, and the probation officer can resolve mis-
understandings and errors of fact before the hearing, the issues
are narrowed and the areas of dispute in court sharpened.0O
The rare cases in which such responsive pleading might expedite
matters or provide more efficiency and clarity to the juvenile
court process are far outweighed by the practical difficulties of
allowing answers and motions with their attendant delays. Fur-
ther, the fact situations upon which juvenile court cases are
based are not so complex that clarification and narrowing of
issues is required prior to the hearing. The decision not to pro-
vide for responsive pleading in the Rules thus seems sound.
D. ADiuIcATmoN PROVISIONS
Once service of summons and notice have been made on the
interested parties, the juvenile court must hold an adjudicatory
hearing. This hearing has a dual purpose. The court must de-
termine whether the allegations, if proven, would constitute
status or conduct sufficient to invoke jurisdiction. If jurisdic-
tion is found, the court must then determine if the facts alleged
in the petition are true. These hearings may be conducted either
by the juvenile court judge or by a referee who has been ap-
pointed by the judge to assist him in his dutiesY1
1. Form of the Adjudication Hearing
The Juvenile Court Act expressly provides that "hearings
on any matter shall be without a jury ... ."92 Despite the re-
90. COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AN DELIN-
QUENCY, MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURT, rule 7, Comment at 19 (1969).
[hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES].
91. MINN. STAT. § 260.031(1) & (2) (1967); MJCR 1-6. The form
of the hearing before a referee is the same as that before a judge. The
referee, upon conclusion of the hearing, makes findings and recom-
mendations to the judge. At the same time he informs the parties of
his findings and recommendations and advises them of their right to
appeal. If within three days the parties make no request for a hearing
before the judge, the referee's findings and recommendations, if con-
firmed by written order of the judge, are final.
92. MINN. STAT. § 260.155 (1) (1967).
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cent trend towards procedural safeguards, the majority of states
do not provide the juvenile with the right to jury.93 The argu-
ment against affording such a right to juveniles is based on
the desirability of retaining a relatively informal setting for
juvenile court hearings. Informal hearings, it is claimed, are not
only a less traumatic experience for the child but also aid in the
rehabilitative process.94 According to the President's Task
Force, in a jury trial or hearing,
formality becomes itself an end insofar as it helps instill injurors a sense of the seriousness and solemnity of their duties.
Moreover, the presence of a jury affects the whole process of
dealing with evidence. Much of the reason for many restrictive
rules of evidence ... stems from the felt need to protect against
a jury's susceptibility to prejudice and irrelevancies and its
limited ability to distinguish between the more and less pro-
bative.9 5
The argument in favor of juries, at least where the delin-
quency is based on an alleged commission of a major crime and
the juvenile is subject to commitment, is a persuasive one, partic-
ularly in light of the recent Supreme Court decision of Duncan
v. Louisiana."6 The Court held therein that the right to a jury
93. California, Illinois, Nebraska and New York have all recently
specifically declined to provide juveniles with the right to a jury trial.
Twelve jurisdictions currently provide some form of jury trial for ju-
veniles. See ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37-8-2 (1964); D.C. CODE ANmr. § 16-2307 (1961); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1967); M ci. Comp. LAWS ANN. ch. 712A.17
(1968); MONT. REv. CODES ANm. § 10-604 (1947); OKLA. STAT. AiNx. tit.
10, § 1110 (Supp. 1968); S.D. COmP. LAWS § 26-8-31 (1967); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. AmN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (b) (Vernon Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 49-5-6 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(2) (1957); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-108(c) (1961).
Recent court decisions in two jurisdictions have invalidated stat-
utes that denied the right to jury trial in delinquency proceedings.
Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (partially in-
validating 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1964) ); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437
P.2d 716 (1968) (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-49 (Supp. 1967) held to be
unconstitutional). See generally Note, Due Process Dilemma-Juriesfor Juveniles, 45 No. DAB. L. REV. 251, 258 (1969).
94. NAT'L PROBATION PAROLE Ass'N, STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT
§ 19, Comment (6th ed. 1959):
Formal procedure is incompatible with the informal confer-
ence atmosphere required by the court to gain the confidence of
child and parents, to elicit the pertinent facts of events, and to
become familiar with the personalities of the parties, their emo-
tional states, and the causes of the difficulty-all of which is
of the utmost importance to a wise disposition of the case.
95. TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 38. See also, Paulsen, Fairness
to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MIn'N. L. REV. 547, 559 (1957); Welch, De-
linquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a
Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REV. 653, 690-92 (1966).
96. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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trial in serious criminal cases is fundamental and must be rec-
ognized by the states as a part of their obligation to provide
due process of law. This holding, when coupled with the Gault
requirement that juvenile court adjudicatory hearings furnish the
essentials of due process to alleged delinquents, is strong prece-
dent for extending some form of jury requirement to juvenile
cases. Further support for such a proposition is found in the
Court's assertion in Duncan that the right to jury trial is a
necessary limiting or restraining influence on the power of the
government in criminal proceedings.97 This spectre of un-
trammeled power has been observed in the juvenile courts as
well:
There is increasing evidence that the informal procedures, con-
trary to the original expectation, may themselves constitute a
further obstacle to effective treatment of the delinquent to the
extent that they engender in the child a sense of injustice pro-
voked by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of
authority by judges and probation officers.98
Arguably, therefore, the Duncan ralionale for the requirement
of a jury is as applicable to the juvenile court delinquency hear-
ing as it is to the criminal trial. It is submitted that Duncan
and Gault will lead to a limited right to a jury hearing-an
appropriate result in light of the historical and sensible justifi-
cations supporting an adult's right to a jury trial.
The case of Debacker v. Brain erd9 9 recently brought the
issue before the Supreme Court. The Nebraska Supreme Court
had ruled that a juvenile alleged to be delinquent on the basis
of a violation of the criminal law was not entitled to a jury
at his adjudicatory hearing,10 0 and the juvenile appealed. The
Court dismissed the appeal in a per curiam opinion, which noted
that Duncan was held to have prospective application only and
97. See, e.g., Justice White's comments in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. at 156:
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or ec-
centric judge .... Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in
the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental de-
cision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to en-
trust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to
one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power
* . . found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or inno-
cence.
98. PRESIDENT's COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND AD. OF Jus-
TicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FRE SOcIETY 85 (1967).
99. 38 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1969).
100. Debacker v. Brainerd, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968).
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that Debacker's adjudicatory hearing was held prior to the Dun-
can decision. Justices Black and Douglas argued in dissent that
the prospective-only application of Duncan was improper, and
that on the merits, the sixth and fourteenth amendments require
a jury hearing where the delinquency charged is based on an
offense which would be a crime triable by a jury if the offender
were an adult. Debacker thus leaves unresolved the difficult,
timely and important question of whether a juvenile is entitled
to a hearing by jury.101
2. Presentation of Evidence
The Minnesota Juvenile Court Act provides that the county
attorney, at the request of the court, shall present the evidence
in support of the petition in a juvenile court proceeding.10 2
This provision has been criticized as creating an atmosphere of
prosecution in the adjudicatory hearing or at least promoting
a more adversarial proceeding. 0 3 The Model Rules propose that
the judge elicit testimony except where complex issues exist as
to disputed facts. Even in those cases, the Model Rules would
not have the state represented by the prosecutor's office.10 4
101. Several other jurisdictions have already decided the question
with varying results. See Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716(1968) (juvenile charged with violation of state law is entitled to jury
in juvenile court if offense is one which would be triable by jury if com-
mitted by adult); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234
A.2d 9 (1967) (denial of jury to juvenile on charge of rape not violative
of juvenile's rights under sixth and fourteenth amendments); Estes v.
Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 272, 438 P.2d 205 (1968) (jury not constitutionally
required in delinquency proceeding); Nieves v. United States, 280 F.
Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Gault read to require availability of jury in
any federal proceeding in which a youth is faced with incarceration
for the commission of an act alleged to be violative of federal law).
The issue was previously before the United States Supreme Court
in In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968), where petitioner alleged that
his adjudication of delinquency was unconstitutional inter alia because
of a denial of jury and the use of a probable cause standard of proof.
The Court vacated the lower court's finding affirming the adjudication
of delinquency and remanded the case for consideration in light of
Gault but gave no indication of its opinion on the jury issue.
For a more detailed discussion of the rights of juveniles to a jury
see generally Note, supra note 93. For a discussion of the related issue
of "peer juries" for juvenile proceedings, see Leger, A Jury of Peers, 17
Juv. CT. JuDGEs J. 150 (Winter, 1967).
102. Mlm. STAT. § 260.155(3) (1967). MJCR 5-2(1), however, pro-
vides that presentation of evidence shall be made by the county attor-
ney at the adjudicatory hearing. MJCR 6-4(1) permits the probation
officer to present the evidence at the dispositional hearing.
103. See comment to MAmx. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(3) (Supp. 1969).
104. MODEL RULES, supra note 90, rule 24 and Comments at 56.
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On the other hand, strong arguments can be advanced for the
proposition that a party independent of the court staff should
present the state's case. In any contested hearing, a judge is
hard-pressed to play the dual role of advocate for the state and
impartial fact finder. If the judge must frame questions and
elicit testimony, it is questionable whether he will be able to
analyze and reflect carefully upon the evidence presented. 105
Perhaps equally important, the juvenile who is the subject of the
cause will look with suspicion on the supposed impartiality of the
judge, and his respect for the eventual adjudication and dispo-
sition will be diminished. These factors clearly outweigh any
danger to the desired informality which may result from the
actions of the prosecutor.
3. Confidentiality of the Hearing
Juvenile Court proceedings have traditionally been confi-
dential, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing the stigma
that might attach from public knowledge of adjudication or dis-
position.10 6 In addition, confidentiality may eliminate what is
often a prime motive for the misconduct-an opportunity for the
child to publicize his "daring" advertures. 1 7 There are strong
policy considerations, however, for permitting the juvenile court
process to operate in full public view. Most frequently heard
is the assertion that "you and I have a right to know the maraud-
105. See Fiqureroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718 (1st Cir. 1966),
where the court held that the Puerto Rico procedure providing that the
trial judge conduct the examination of prosecution witnesses and cross-
examination of defense witnesses was violative of due process of law.
Under the procedure in the Puerto Rico District Court the judge
must alternate roles in rapid succession, or even assume both at
once. Thus, when interrogating a witness he is examining for
the people, but when listening to the answer to the question hehas propounded, he is weighing it as judge, and at the same time
considering what question, as prosecutor, to ask next. Corres-
pondingly, when he listens to the answer to a question put by
the defense, he must, as judge, impartially evaluate the answer,
but, simultaneously, as prosecutor, he must prepare the next
question for cross-examination. The mental attitudes of thejudge and prosecutor are at considerable variance. To keep
these two personalities entirely distinct seems an almost impos-
sible burden for even the most dedicated and fairminded of
men.
Id. at 720.
106. See, e.g., Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 281, 285-86 (1967).
107. See, e.g., Arthur, Should Children be as Equal as People, 45
No. DAx. L. REv. 204, 213-14 (1969). See also Gels, Publication of the
Names of Juvenile Felons, 23 MoNT. L. BEV. 141, 154 (1962); H. SALs-
BURY, THE SHOOK-UP GENERATIoN 164 (1958).
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ers in our neighborhood."' 0 8 The better view would seem to
be that conducting proceedings in full view of the public will pro-
tect the child from arbitrary dispositions and other unfairness 0 9
Many also contend that publicizing juvenile proceedings acts as
a deterrent to other potential delinquents, and helps to rehabili-
tate the juvenile who is the subject of the publicity." 0 Obviously,
no solution would fully resolve these conflicting considerations,
but most juvenile courts have affected some sort of compromise.
The Minnesota Act provides that the juvenile court "shall ex-
clude the general public from these hearings and shall admit
only those persons who, in the discretion of the court, have a di-
rect interest in the case or in the work of the court."'" It is un-
clear whether representatives of the press are included in this
exception. In any event, the Rules do provide that unsealed
records may be made available to "responsible representatives
of public information media," provided that such representatives
agree not to publicize the identity of the child or his parents.,"2
Such a provision would seem to imply a right to observe the
proceedings themselves.
4. Amendment of the Petition
In some cases, there will be a variance between the facts
proved at the adjudicatory hearing and those alleged in the peti-
tion. There may also be some reason for amending or altering
the petition prior to the hearing stage or after adjudication.
The Act, while providing for the outright dismissal of a peti-
tion," 8 is silent on the matter of amendment or alteration. The
Rules, however, specifically provide for amendment without the
consent of any of the parties up to the time evidence is presented,
108. See Geis, supra note 107, at 152.
109. Arthur, supra note 107, at 214. But Judge Arthur points out,
"a lawyer, a court reporter, and an appellate court can provide better
protection." Id.
110. See, e.g., Loble, Montana's Experiment with Juvenile Crime,
AMEHicAN LEGION MAGAZINE 50 (No. 6, Dec. 1963). But see Statement
by the NATIONAL CoUNclL ON CRnvm AND DELINQUENCY, OPEN HEARINGS
IN JUVENILE COURTS IN MONTANA (Nov. 1964): "In one short year ...
in the court presided over by [Judge Loble] there has been a 58 percent
increase ... in juvenile felony cases .... " noted in Arthur, supra note
107, at 213.
111. MmIN. STAT. § 260.155(1) (1967).
112. MJCR 11-2(2) (d). The right of the press to observe is spe-
cifically granted in PROPOSED JUVENILE COURT RULES FOR HENNEPIN
COUNTY § 5.04 (Draft No. 2, Dec. 31, 1968).
113. MINN. STAT. § 260.181(1) (1967).
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or at any time thereafter if all the parties consent." 4 Since the
county attorney is not a party w.ithin the definition of the
Rules, 11 presumably his consent is, never required. Thus, he
could not prevent the court from amending a petition by with-
holding consent, as he might be tempted to do if charges against
a youth were reduced"n 6
The extent of allowable changes, however, is not delineated
by the Rules. Presumably a petition alleging delinquency could
be altered to allege dependency and vice versa', or an allegation
of delinquency based on a specific violation of law might be
amended to allege delinquency based on waywardness. Such
changes may be motivated by a desire to charge the child with a
less serious allegation and restrict disposition alternatives. On
the other hand, they may be made for the less benevolent reason
of assuring a finding against a youth."17 The danger of surprise
due to alteration prior to presentation of evidence, however, is
mitigated by the Rules' provision for a continuance to prepare a
defense responsive to the amended petition." 8 After the intro-
duction of evidence the dangers are mitigated by the Rules' con-
sent requirement." 9 A possible additional safeguard would be
to require the consent of all parties at all times, but this could be
easily circumvented by merely dropping the cause and filing a
new petition setting forth the amended allegation. In fact, this
ability to file a new petition makes the amending issue some-
what moot, at least as a matter of substance. However, the abil-
ity to amend does retain procedural vitality since it obviates the
need for many of the technicalities incident to filing a new peti-
tion.
5. Requirement for Written Findings
The Supreme Court in Gault seemed particularly dismayed
114. MJCR 3-6(1) & (2).
115. MJCR 1-2(o).
116. MJCR 1-2(o) does provide that a "'party' means ... any
other person designated by the court in a given cause" and thus argu-
ably the county attorney could be named a party by the court. It
seems doubtful, however, that a court would so provide.
117. Note, supra note 106, at 308. The authors point out, for exam-
ple, that the juvenile court judge could change the allegation of a spe-
cific criminal violation to a general charge of misconduct in order to
assure a finding against the youth. They point to a survey of 12judges in which 10 replied they would alter a petition from theft, which
could not be proven, to truancy or curfew violation if there were evi-
dence that the child had been in the area of the robbery and was in
need of some restraint. Id.
118. MJCR 3-6(3).
119. See note 114 supra.
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with the lack of concrete factual findings to support the juvenile
court judge's ultimate finding of delinquency. 120 Such haphaz-
ard determinations are precluded by the Rules' requirement that
an adjudicatory order be supported by written findings of fact
upon which the judge relied for his adjudication order.1 12 ' This
same requirement also applies to dispositional orders.122 Any
additional work load for the courts caused by such requirements
is clearly outweighed by the encouragement of precision and ob-
jectivity and the facilitation of appellate review.
E. DISPOSITION PROVISIONS OF THE RuLEs
1. Presentation of Evidence
The Rules provide that the county attorney or probation offi-
cer, rather than the judge, shall represent the state at the dis-
position hearing.123 Although this tends to formalize the pro-
cedure, it reinforces the judge's position of impartiality and ob-
jectivity. By allowing a probation officer to present evidence,
however, a problem may be created if the officer later attempts
to work with the child. If the officer has argued for a disposition
which the child thinks is unfair or distasteful, the child will un-
doubtedly distrust the probation officer's later attempts to help
him. On the other hand, probation officers would usually have
compiled the reports and studies which are the basis for disposi-
tion, and arguably are best qualified to present them at the
hearing.
2. Investigations and Reports
The foundation of the dispositional decision lies in the re-
ports and investigations authorized by statute.12 4 The adoption
of specific procedures applying to these reports and investiga-
tions is a major accomplishment of the Rules.
a. Type of Investigation or Report
In contrast to the Act, the Rules specify procedures for four
different kinds of reports: a social study, a medical examination,
a reference study and a traffic offender study. It would seem
that everything that could possibly be helpful in determining
120. 387 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
121. MJCR 5-4(2).
122. MJCR 6-6 states, "The court shall include in such order ...
findings which set forth the reasons why the court decided on the par-
ticular disposition embodied in its order, and the facts upon which such
reasons were based."
123. MJCR 6-4(1).
124. MINN. STAT. § 260.151 (1967).
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the proper disposition of a child can fit into one of these cate-
gories. Thus there seems to be little danger that some informa-
tion which might be helpful to the court is beyond the gathering
authority of the probation staff or welfare board. While such
broad authority to gather information may be regarded as
hindering the policy of confidentiality, 125 the insurance of proper
disposition through the availability of all potentially relevant
information is the preferable goal.
b. Persons Subject to Studies and Examinations
The Act's provision governing studies and examinations
simply states that the court may request the probation officer or
county welfare board to investigate the personal and family his-
tory of any minor within the jurisdiction of the court, or order
such a minor to be examined by a physician, psychiatrist or
psychologist.126 The Act does not authorize studies or exami-
nations of a parent.
The Rules, however, do provide that a parent may be the
subject of a social study or medical examination. With respect
to a social study, the Rules state that the court may order a so-
cial study of the subject of the cause and further provide that
the parent is the subject of the cause in a dependency, neglect
or termination-of-parental-rights proceeding.12 7 Apparently, the
parent's consent is not required. It is doubtful whether this
power is a significant expansion of the statutory authority since
the Act's authorization of a social s;tudy of the child will, in
most cases, furnish the pertinent data about both child and par-
ent. Nevertheless, it does widen the scope of the court's investi-
gative powers and may prove beneficial in situations where the
parent would object to being examined in the course of the
child's social study.
More important is the provision relating to the medical ex-
amination of a parent,128 though unfortunately (and, for the
Rules, uncharacteristically) the provision is not without some
ambiguity. One interpretation is that a parent may be subjected
to an examination only if he consents. 29 The preferable and
125. See generally Note, Employment of Social Investigation Re-
ports in Criminal and Juvenile Proceedings, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 702
(1958).
126. MVinN. STAT. § 260.151 (1967).
127. See MJCR 10-1(2).
128. MJCR 10-2(2).
129. MJCR 10-2(1) and the last sentence of MJCR 10-2(2) con-
strued together arguably may be interpreted as requiring a parent's
consent before he is the subject of a medical examination. It should
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more justifiable interpretation is that the court may order the
medical examination of a parent without his consent in a de-
pendency, neglect or termination-of-parental-rights cause pro-
vided the parent's physical or mental health is a relevant issue.130
Obviously in these causes the physical or mental condition of a
parent may be relevant but for any number of reasons a parent
might not consent to an examination. In such a case the court
must have the authority to order the parent's examination if a
proper disposition is to be effected.
It does seem clear that the Rules prohibit the examination
of a parent without his consent in a delinquency or traffic of-
fender cause. Such a prohibition appears appropriate since it
will be an unusual case where the physical or mental condition
of a parent has contributed to a child's delinquency or traffic
offense. And even in such a case where the court suspects the
medical status of a parent is relevant and he will not consent
to an examination, it would be easy (and proper) to amend the
petition to allege neglect and then order the examination. 13 1
c. Stage of Preparation
All investigations and reports, except the traffic offense and
reference studies, can be made only after the allegations of the
petition have either been admitted or proven in an adjudicatory
hearing. 32 The obvious purpose of such a restriction is to pro-
tect the privacy of a child or his parent who may not be within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. At first, such a restric-
tion appears to cause problems. For example, a petition may
allege delinquency based on some type of misconduct and an ad-
be noted that MJCR 10-2 never expressly states that the subject of the
cause may be ordered to undergo an examination without his consent.
130. MJCR 10-2(2) states that the parent is the subject of a de-
pendency, neglect or termination-of-parental-rights cause and that the
child is the subject of a delinquency or traffic offender cause. It fur-
ther provides that the subject of the cause may be ordered to undergo
an examination when the allegations of the petition have been either
admitted or proved. Finally, it states a "parent of the child who is the
subject of the cause" (i.e. a parent of a delinquent or traffic offender)
may not be subjected to an examination without his consent. The ex-
press requirement of consent when a parent is not the subject of a
cause implies that when he is the subject of the cause, as in a depend-
ency or neglect cause, his consent is not required.
131. See M.N.. STAT. § 260.015(10) (i) (1967) which defines a neg-
lected child as one coming "within the provisions of subdivision 5
[i.e. definition of delinquent], but whose conduct results in whole or in
part from parental neglect."
132. MJCR 10-2(2).
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judication of delinquency results. Upon perusal of the social
study, however, the court finds that the delinquency is directly
related to a family situation so disruptive that a neglect or de-
pendency finding would have been more appropriate. A number
of remedies, however, then become available to facilitate a proper
disposition of the child. The court may be able to amend, alter
or dismiss the petition, and cause a neglect or dependency pe-
tition to be filed,1 33 or the adjuciation of delinquency may be
expunged, and the record thereof may be sealed. Thus, the
inability to investigate prior to adjudication will not harm the
child and the greater danger of unwarranted intrusion into the
privacy of a child and his family is avoided.
d. Presentation of Reports and Examinations
Social studies and reports of medical examinations are hear-
say evidence and, as such, inadmissible in criminal proceedings.
13 4
The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that hearsay can be
considered at the sentencing hearing following adjudication at
trial,135 and this holding should certainly apply as well to a
juvenile dispositional hearing, particularly when it is clearly
separate from the adjudication hearing. Thus it seems well
established that the hearsay objection may be met without the
preparer of the report or study testifying in person as to the con-
tents thereof. 36 The Rules do provide, however, that the parties
to a cause may inspect any such report or study, 37 cross-examine
the preparer of the report and introduce evidence contesting or
clarifying data contained in the report.138 A suggested addition
to this right of inspection is to provide the parties with copies
of the report or study, with any costs to be borne by the request-
ing parties unless indigent.
3. Types of Disposition Authorized
Authorized disposition for children adjudicated delinquent
133. See note 131 supra.
134. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (19,35).
135. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 24:1 (1949).
136. See, e.g., In re Halamuda, 85 Cal. App. 2d 219, 192 P.2d 781
(1948) (youth allowed to see and challenge accuracy of these documents
is deprived of no constitutional protection).
137. If the parties are represented by counsel, such counsel may
inspect the reports. Unrepresented parties may inspect the report them-
selves, except that, "if the court deems it not in the best interests of
the child for the child or parent to see all or any part of a report," it
shall appoint counsel who may inspect. M.TCR 10-5.
138. MJCR 10-5.
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ranges from oral admonition to institutional commitment, and
between these two extremes lie a host of alternatives.39 The
lack of foster homes and other nonrestrictive facilities offering
an improved environment can impose a severe limitation on the
courts and often force a judge to choose between commitment
and returning the child to an unsuitable home. Occasionally,
however, it appears that the juvenile court does not make the
best use of the available resources.140
The Rules, following the Act, make no distinction between
delinquency based on acts which would be criminal if committed
by an adult and delinquency based on conduct peculiar to juve-
niles, such as truancy. Several statutes require that delinquency
be based on the commission of a criminal act before commit-
ment can be ordered.' 41 Such a policy seems eminently sound,
particularly when one considers that many juvenile institutions
are little more than junior prisons. 142
The Minnesota Act does restrict the types of disposition
available for those children adjudged neglected or dependent.
No commitment may be ordered nor can any disposition, whether
protective supervision in the home or transfer of legal custody,
exceed a period of one year. The court may, however, renew
the disposition order until the child is 21 provided that a new
hearing is held.143
If a child is adjudged a traffic offender, the juvenile court
may impose restrictions on his driver's license. If the child has
committed two offenses or "contributed" to an accident, his
license may be suspended until the age of 18 but the court
cannot order fines or commitment. 14 4
After termination of parental rights, the court may transfer
guardianship and legal custody to either a welfare agency, a
child placing agency or a reputable individual. 145
139. MINN. STAT. § 260.185(1) (1967).
140. See, e.g., Minneapolis Tribune, March 18, 1969, at 19, col. 3,
which reports the commitment of a girl 14 years of age to an institu-
tion after a finding of delinquency based on the child having run away
"four or five" times. Commitment was ordered despite the request of
an elementary school principal and his wife that they be given custody
of the child.
141. See, e.g., UNIuoRm JUvmm COURT AcT, supra note 41, § 2 (2)
(1968).
142. See generally TAsK FORCE, supra note 31, at 8.
143. M IN. STAT. § 260.191(2) (1967).
144. MiNm. STAT. § 260.193(5) (1967).
145. Mu. STAT. § 260.241 (1967).
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F. APPEAL A REVIEw PROVISIONS
1. Appeal of Juvenile Court Orders
In Gault, the Supreme Court reiterated that "this Court
has not held that a State is required by the Federal Constitution
'to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at
all.' "146 Nevertheless, a respected juvenile court judge has writ-
ten: "Appeal should be as of right. It should be readily avail-
able and financially feasible ... . Appeal is the only real pro-
tection against an improper trial court. 1 47
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's pronouncements, the
Minnesota Act provides that "an appeal may be taken by the
aggrieved person from a final order affecting a substantial right
of the aggrieved person."' 48 The statute is ambiguous as to
whether an appeal can follow immecliately upon the filing of an
adjudicatory finding or whether it must await the dispositional
order. The better view would seem. to require a final disposi-
tional order and such an interpretation is possible by arguing
that an adjudicatory order affects no substantial right and thus
cannot be appealed. 49 Whether appeals are limited to the child
who is the subject of the cause or whether his parents may also
appeal depends on the definition of a "substantial right." It
would seem clear that the parents have a substantial right to
custody of their child and thus may appeal an order divesting
them of custody, but the phrase needs judicial clarification.
It should be noted that appeals from probate-juvenile court
orders are heard de novo by the district court, whose orders in
turn can be appealed to the Supreme Court in the same manner
in which appeals are taken in other civil actions.50 District-
juvenile court orders are appealable directly to the Supreme
Court.' 5' The distinction in procedure probably results from
the fact that probate-juvenile courts in some counties consist of
a judge who is not an attorney.
The Rules might have defined an "aggrieved person" and
determined whether appeal was possible only after the adjudi-
cation hearing or whether the appellant must wait until the
146. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
147. Arthur, supra note 107, at 217.
148. MNN. STAT. § 260.291(1) (1967).
149. But see generally Note, Sealing of Juvenile Court Records, 54
MINN. L. REV. 433 (1969) where it is argued that adjudication raises
a stigma that may hinder or preclude subsequent employment.
150. MmU . STAT. § 260.291(2) (1967).
151. MIUN. STAT. § 260.291(2) (1967).
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court has ordered disposition. These issues must now await ju-
dicial determination.
2. Review of the Disposition Order
Two features of the juvenile court require that the disposi-
tional orders be periodically reviewed. First, the juvenile court
may exercise control over a child for the period of his minority;
second, control or regulation of a child once he has been suffi-
ciently rehabilitated would be contrary to the goal of the ju-
venile court which supposedly eschews deterrent or retributive
treatment. Both the Act and the Rules provide for periodic
review by the juvenile court of prior orders with respect to de-
linquency, neglect or dependency causes.152 Generally, a dispo-
sitional order shall be reviewed at least annually, or if for a pe-
riod of less than one year, at least once prior to its expiration
date. If a dispositional order transfers the legal custody of a
child to the Youth Conservation Commission, to any licensed
child placing agency or to the county welfare board, review is
not required by the court. It will, however, be accomplished by
those agencies pursuant to applicable regulations or statutes.
153
The review required by the Act and the Rules could argu-
ably be made more frequent or timely. It is conceivable that a
child could be placed on probation for 12 months and the review
of the order made shortly before its automatic termination
though the child had no need of probation after, for example,
the third month. A better procedure would be to retain the cur-
rent standards as a minimum but provide that persons subject
to juvenile court orders shall have the right to petition for review.
Such a privilege would not unduly burden the courts if it were
restricted by barring petitions until a certain amount of time had
elapsed and limiting the frequency of such petitions.
Upon review, the court may temper or dismiss the disposi-
tional order without qualification, but can increase its severity
only if a hearing which meets all the requirements of an adju-
dicatory hearing is held. The Rules do not provide any standards
to guide the court in reducing or increasing the severity of a dis-
positional order. When a more severe order is sought, it would
seem advisable to require some showing of misconduct beyond
152. AN. STAT. § 260.185(4) (1967); MJCR 6-7.
153. See, e.g., MNN. STAT. §§ 242.10, 242.36 (1967) which set forth
the powers and obligations of the Youth Conservation Commission with
respect to review of commitment orders.
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that which was the cause of the initial order. Indeed, the issue
of double jeopardy must be considered if the severity of an
order is increased without a showing of new misconduct.15 4
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the Minnesota Juvenile Court
Rules, as well as the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act, meet the re-
quirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court for
juvenile courts. As Dean Paulsen's introductory comment im-
plies, however, revamping juvenile court procedure to meet the
standards of constitutional due process or the procedural stand-
ards of criminal courts is not enough. What is needed is a far-
ranging revision of the statutory scheme to include a redefinition
of what conduct should be the basis for juvenile court jurisdic-
tion. Even more urgently needed are drastic increases in finan-
cial support for the institutions, agencies and personnel charged
with juvenile rehabilitation and imaginative, committed people
with new ideas for solving this country's delinquency problem.
Failure to meet these needs will insure growing numbers of neg-
lected, malcontent and destructive young people.
154. See Note, Double Jeopardy and. Due Process in the Juvenile
Courts, 29 U. Pir. L. REv. 756 (1968).
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